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16 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: RIE 100-60: "Perspective of the World Situation"

As usual, the major issues in this paper have been those of tone rather than substance. We have tried to make it as objective and inclusive as possible, with no shrill note of alarm or gloom but not too much cheer either. The following are identifiable issues:

1. Whether to have a Summary. The Board (and DNI) are strongly inclined not to include a Summary. However, Army and, at times, Joint Staff and State have urged that one be done at least for USIB to look at. Accordingly, we have done a careful drafting and paraphrasing job, attached, in such shape that if it were your judgment and that of USIB that one should be included, there would be reasonable hope of cloning it up in the same session.

2. Paragraph 1 of Part. State wants to land right at the outset on a "hard" note. Our paragraph 1 merely recites facts and their obvious and immediate implications; we go on later to say much the same things State's footnote says, but in a broader context. We much prefer our text.

3. Paragraph 8 of Text (C of summary). This is straight summary from the USIA text of 11-4. We have, however, tried to frame a re-wording of it, which we consider an improvement and which might also get rid of the Air Force footnote.

4. Further to paragraph 8, e. deals with Berlin and disarmament. Some readers have felt it was too flat-footedly negative on disarmament, particularly in summary form. It is, however, true to 11-4. The problem is that your reviewers will think we mean by "limited agreements."

5. Paragraphs 16-18 of Text. This text on Sino-Soviet relations goes a bare notch further than 11-4, looking further ahead than five years. All hands have agreed so far, but there may well be argument at USIA.

6. Paragraph 25 of Text. State's proposal just seems too cheery to us, and they admit that it may not reflect Ambassador MacArthur's views. It says pretty clearly what we mean in the paragraph anyway, and "good prospect" seems to us a much fairer description. Not a major issue, though.

7. Last sentence of paragraph 33 of Text. This reference to anti-Commun sentiment in the UI seems to us the very least we can say about this. State has objected even to this.

8. Paragraph 42 of Text. This note of warning on West Germany again seems to us the least that should be said. State has fought it, but is now apparently in line.

9. Paragraph 43 of Text. Joint Staff wants us to give a flat prediction on whether the effectiveness of NATO will be reduced. We feel it depends far too much on US policy to go further than "may."

10. Paragraph 65 of Text. State's proposal would say that communists won't even get "significant political stature" in any African country over the next five years. We think this much too sanguine, having in mind Guinea, Kenya, Cameroun, and the many other possible upheaval situations into which communists could move to get at least a temporary position of strong influence.

11. Paragraph 74 of Text. Air Force can't buy even "strong opposition" by world opinion to the use of nuclear weapons in limited conflicts. They also can't think our allies will be "increasingly" infected by this. We think the statement almost self-evident.

For Sherman Kent
Chairman, Board of
National Estimates